We revisit the question of the efficiency of individual decisions to be protected against crime for the cases of both observable and unobservable protection. We obtain that observable protection is unambiguously associated with a negative externality and that at the individual level, it has a...

We propose a market-for-offenses model of property crime, which explicitly accounts for protection expenditures among heterogeneous individuals. The crime equilibrium is modeled as a free-access equilibrium in which the match between criminals and victims equates the average returns to crime. We...

We consider the factor payment effects of a transition from open access to restricted access in the resource sector in the long-run, i.e., when both labor and capital are mobile between sectors. We show that the transition benefits (harms) the factor that is initially used more (less)...

We study the political economy of the environment in autocratic, weak and strong democracies when individuals can mitigate the health consequences of domestic pollution privately as well as control pollution collectively through public policies. We consider a small open economy with comparative...

CWe consider the factor payment effects of a transition from open access to restricted access in the resource sector in the long-run, i.e., when both labor and capital are mobile between sectors. We show that the transition benefits (harms) the factor that is initially used more (less)...

Acknowledging the differential ability of individuals to privately mitigate the consequences of domestic pollution for their health is essential for an understanding of their demands for regulation of the environment and of trade in dirty goods, and for analysis of the implications of these...

We study the political economy of the environment in autocratic, weak and strong democracies when individuals can either mitigate the health consequences of domestic pollution privately or reduce pollution collectively through public policy. The setting is that of a small open economy in which...

We study the nature of individual demands for environmental regulation and for trade openness in the general equilibrium of a small open economy where the environment is an input to production. Differences in the ability of individuals to afford private mitigation of the adverse consequences of...

We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive polical economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influcence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed.