It is shown that the median voter theorem for committee-decisions holds over a full unimodal preference domain whenever (i) the underlying median interval space satisfi?es interval antiexchange and (ii) unimodality is defi?ned with respect to the incidence-geometry of the relevant outcome space...

It is argued that if a finite partially ordered population is given, and incomparability is taken as the relevant type of dissimilarity, then diversity comparisons between subpopulations may be conveniently based on widths namely on the maximum number of pairwise incomparable units they include....

Two distinct specifications of single peakedness as currently met in the relevant literature are singled out and discussed. Then, it is shown that, under both of those specifications, a voting rule as defined on a bounded distributive lattice is strategy-proof on the set of all profiles of...

It is shown that a social choice rule f : X^N ? X as defined on a bounded distributive lattice (X, ) is strategy-proof on the set of all profiles of unimodal total preorders on X if and only if it can be represented as an iterated median of projections and constants. The equivalence of individual...

A parameterized characterization of height-based total extensions of principal filtral opportunity rankings is provided and shown to include, as a special case, a version of the well-known Pattanaik-Xu characterization of the cardinality-based ranking. ***** <p>Se presenta una caracterización...</p>

We address the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets in terms of poverty. In order to accomplish this task, we identify a suitable notion of ‘multidimensional poverty line’ and we characterize axiomatically several poverty rankings of opportunity profiles. Among them, the...

We address the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets in terms of poverty. In order to accomplish this task, we identify a suitable notion of ‘multidimensional poverty line’ and we characterize axiomatically several poverty rankings of opportunity profiles. Among them, the...

A voting protocol is said to be strongly β-participatory if for any voter i and any strategy profile either the outcome is i′s preferred one or i has a sincere strategy which would ensure her a better outcome, and VNM-strategy-proof if at any preference profile the set of sincere strategies...

We address the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets in terms of poverty. In order to accomplish this task, we identify a suitable notion of `multidimensional poverty line', extend the most widely used income poverty criteria to opportunity profiles, and provide characterizations...

The domain of polyconvex sets, i.e. finite unions of convex, compact, Euclidean sets, is large enough to encompass most of the opportunity sets typically encountered in economic environments, including non-linear or even non-convex budget sets, and opportunity sets arising from production sets....