In a sequential bargaining model of coalition formation and payoff M division players form demands for their participation in a coalition. These M demands have some appealing, intuitive features. We characterize the sets of M semi-stable and stable demands vectors for general NTU games using M...

In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable and if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for...

We revisit the well-known result that asserts that an increase in the degree of one's risk aversion improves the position of one's opponents. To this end, we apply Yaari's dual theory of choice under risk both to Nash's bargaining problem and to Rubinstein's game of alternating offers. Under...

Tacit coordination in large groups is studied in an iterated market entry game with complete information and multiple market capacities that are varied randomly from period to period. On each period, each player must decide independently whether to enter any of the markets, and if entering,...

A multi-person bargaining model based on sequential demands is studied for coalitional games with increasing returns to scale for cooperation. We show that for such games, the (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior leads to a payoff distribution which approaches the Shapley value as the money...

This paper considers a model of society [script S] with a finite number of individuals, n, a finite set off alternatives, Omega, effective coalitions that must contain an a priori given number q of individuals. Its purpose is to extend the Nakamura Theorem (1979) to the quota games where...

We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if...