This paper considers a procedurally fair provision mechanism that allows members of a small group to determine, through their bids, which project to implement. Previous experiments with (only) costly projects have demonstrated that the mechanism is efficiency enhancing. Our experiment tests...

Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. Here, we investigate procedural fairness as in Güth (2011). In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario...

This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects pro- vision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...

This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects’ costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...

We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is induced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group members are additionally related by outcome interdependence established in a prior public goods game. Moving...

We report on an experiment designed to explore the interrelation of other-regarding concerns with attitudes towards risk and delay when the latter have a social dimension, i.e., pertain to one's own and another person's payoffs. For this sake, we compare evaluations of several prospects, each of...

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic...

"When explaining risk taking, intertemporal allocation, and distributing behavior, economists rely on risk, time, and other-regarding preferences but offer no guidance on how these three crucial aspects are interrelated. We report on an experiment exploring such interrelation. For this sake, we...

In one-shot investment game experiments where each player's payoff is a convex combination of own and other's profit, trust remains unaffected by the extent of interdependence whereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it.

We experimentally investigate whether the satisficing approach is absorbable, i.e., whether it still applies after participants become aware of it. In a setting where an investor decides between a riskless bond and either one or two risky assets, we familiarize participants with the satisficing...