We present a simplified model of the evolution of a society which is regulated by a formal unanimity voting procedure. We examine several protocols, which depend on whether admission or expulsion are permissible, and on the order with which they are implemented. Conditions which ensure the...

We study fundamental properties of monotone network enterprises which contain public vertices and have positive and negative costs on edges and vertices. Among the properties studied are the nonemptiness of the core, characterization of nonredundant core constraints, ease of computation of the...

The reactive bargaining set (Granot [1994]) is the set of outcomes for which no justified objection exists. Here, in a justified objection the objector first watches how the target tries to act (if he has such an option), and then reacts by making a profit and ruining the target's attempt to...

The Shapley-Ichiishi result states that a game is convex if and only if the convex hull of marginal vectors equals the core. In this paper we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalence classes of balanced games that share the same core structure. We then associate a system of linear...

In this paper we consider a generalization of the minimum cost spanning tree game. The generalized model allows for more than one supplier, where each supplier offers a different type of service to the customers and each customer specifies a non-empty subset of these suppliers to which he wishes...

A repairman makes a round-trip along a set of customers. He starts in his home location, visits each customer exactly once, and returns home. The cost of his trip has to be shared by the customers. A cooperative cost game, called routing game, is associated with this allocation problem, and an...

We consider bin packing games introduced by Faigle and Kern (1993) and we restrict ourselves to the subclass of games for which all bins have unit capacity and all items are larger than 1/3. We adopt the taxation model of Faigle and Kern and we prove that for a tax-rate of ɛ=sk 7/1 the ɛ-core...

The lexicographic kernel of a game lexicographically maximizes the surplusses s ij (rather than the excesses as would the nucleolus) and is contained in both the least core and the kernel. We show that an element in the lexicographic kernel can be computed efficiently, provided we can...

We consider bin packing games introduced by Faigle and Kern (1993) and we restrict ourselves to the subclass of games for which all bins have unit capacity and all items are larger than 1/3. We adopt the taxation model of Faigle and Kern and we prove that for a tax-rate of ɛ=sk<Subscript>7/1</Subscript> the ɛ-core...</subscript>