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In this paper, we consider the problem, introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (Games Econ Behav 43:322–325, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2003</CitationRef>), of sharing the income from the sell of passes that allow the entrance in a set of museums. First, we recall some allocation rules and some properties presented in Ginsburgh and Zang...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010989651
A class of cooperative TU-games arising from shortest path problems is introduced and analyzed. Some conditions under which a shortest path game is balanced are obtained. Also an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value for this class of games is provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999810
In this paper we introduce and characterize some allocation rules for weighted bankruptcy problems. We illustrate the relevancy of weighted bankruptcy by applying it to analyse the museum pass problem, introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003). This application is completed with the analysis of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009249551
A class of cooperative TU-games arising from shortest path problems is introduced and analyzed. Some conditions under which a shortest path game is balanced are obtained. Also an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value for this class of games is provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010759405
In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these playersÂ’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464109
In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464113
We define and study games with limited aspirations. In a game with limited aspirations there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the effect of the restrictions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005587616
In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593744
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005338074
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