The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the expert, who is the better informed agent,...

This article is concerned with job design, that is, the grouping of tasks into jobs, in teams of risk-neutral homogeneous agents. It shows that when only some tasks are observable by the agents or monitorable by the principal, job design can restrict the set of sequential equilibria to the...

The survey is focused on the typical problems in information transmission from experts to non-experts. Attention is paid to the factors that can affect information disclosure in models that apply a game-theoretic approach to the use of professional advice. In the economic literature expertise is...

For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50:1431–1451, <CitationRef CitationID="CR3">1982</CitationRef>) the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same...</citationref>

The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium...