We study the optimal management of teams in which agents’ effort decisions are mapped (via a production technology) into the probability of the team’s success. Optimal wage schemes in such context are largely discriminatory, but we show that the extent of the discrimination crucially depends...

We study optimal wage schemes for teams, under the presence of budget constraints, in a model in which agents’ effort decisions are mapped into the probability of the team’s success. We show that (first-best) efficiency can only be attained with complex contracts that are vulnerable to ex...

This paper reports an experimental investigation on two mechanisms for the so-called King Solomon Dilemma, where one of them fails to implement the social choice rule dynamically. We compare the two mechanisms in terms of their welfare, incentive and learning properties. Copyright...

We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2×2 anti-coordination games – games where a player’s best response is to choose an action unlike that of her partner. We characterize the equilibrium networks as well as study the effects...

This paper studies how a behavior spreads in a population. We consider a network of interacting agents whose actions are determined by the actions of their neighbors, according to a simple diffusion rule. We find, using a mean-field approach, the threshold for the spreading rate above which the...

We consider a model of social interactions in which agents are assumed to acquire information from others through a certain sampling process that generates an influence network. These networks comprise a wide array of options depending on the level of correlation assumed between agents' in and...

Some behaviors, ideas or technologies spread and become persistent in society, whereas others vanish. This paper analyzes the role of social influence in determining such distinct collective outcomes. Agents are assumed to acquire information from others through a certain sampling process, that...

We study the provision of a public good in a social network where links are directed, i.e., the information flows one way. Our results relate, through stochastic dominance, the equilibrium outcome of such a process with the out-degree distribution of the network.

The objective of this work is to analyze how social networks coevolve with other dimensions of agents' choice. We present a model where agents choose their neighbors as well as a mode of behavior in 2 × 2 anti-coordination games, i.e. games where an individual's best response is to behave...

We propose a model where agents located in a social network decide whether or not to exert effort to provide a local public good. We assume that they have strong incentives to free-ride on their neighbors’ effort decisions. We characterize the equilibria of the induced game. We also study a...