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We associate to each cost spanning tree problem a non-cooperative game, which is inspired by a real-life problem. We study the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. We prove that these equilibria are closely related with situations where agents connect sequentially to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847550
Multi-issue allocation situations are used to study the problem of having to divide an estate among a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each agent on each issue. We present several axiomatic characterizations of the constrained equal awards...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999868
Tijs et al. [23] introduce the family of obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems. We give a generalization of such family. We prove that our family coincides with the set of rules satisfying an additivity property and a cost monotonicity property. We also provide two new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865264
Multi-issue allocation situations are used to study the problem of having to divide an estate among a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each agent on each issue. We present several axiomatic characterizations of the constrained equal awards...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010759455
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We characterize a rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems using an additivity property and some basic properties. If the set of possible agents has at least three agents, these basic properties are symmetry and separability. If the set of possible agents has two agents, we must add positivity.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005520936
We define the canonical form of a cost spanning tree problem. The canonical form has the property that reducing the cost of any arc, the minimal cost of connecting agents to the source is also reduced. We argue that the canonical form is a relevant concept in this kind of problems and study a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407561
In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407618