In this paper we extend Kreps and Scheinkam's (1983) results to mixed-duopolies with linear demands and constant unit costs. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield to Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

In this paper we generalize the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed-duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

The relationship of managerial bonuses and profit maximization is interesting both from an economic and a managerial viewpoint. Our contribution to this literature is showing that progressive managerial bonuses can increase profits in a spatial Bertrand competition, and furthermore they can help...

Vegyes oligopóliumoknak nevezzük az olyan piacszerkezeteket, amelyek esetében a magánvállalatok mellett állami vállalatok is tevékenykednek. A vegyes oligopóliumokban az állami vállalatok részben vagy egészében a társadalmi többletet kívánják maximalizálni. Olyan vegyes...

A kiskereskedelmi árrögzítés évtizedek óta vitatott kérdés a közgazdasági elméletben. Az Egyesült Államok legfelsőbb bíróságának közelmúltbeli döntése - megszüntetve az ilyen típusú árkorlátozások önmagában törvénytelennek ítélését - ismételten felhívta a...

In this article we examine the effects of third degree price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. We show that the average price is not affected by the extent of price discrimination. We find that the asymmetry between firms is reflected only by the output produced for the...

Theoretical articles on incentive systems almost exclusively focus on linear compensations, while, in practice, nonlinear elements, such as quota bonuses, are not uncommon. Our article tries to bridge that gap; it shows how the use of quotas can increase the owners’ profits, which agents are...

In this paper we extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixedduopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

Anchoring is a well-known decision-making bias: original guesses for a certain question could act as anchors and could influence our final answers. Reference prices - in a similar fashion - can lead to a bias in consumer valuations, and thus consumer demand will be coherent but not one derived...

Anchoring is a well-known decision-making bias: original guesses for a certain question could act as anchors and could influence our final answers. Reference prices - in a similar fashion - can lead to a bias in consumer valuations, and thus consumer demand will be coherent but not one derived...