We study the steady-state of a market with inflowing cohorts of buyers and sellers who are randomly matched pairwise and bargain under private information. Two bargaining protocols are considered: take-it-or-leave-it offering and the double auction. There are frictions due to costly search and...

We explore the role of private information in bilateral matching and bargaining. Our model is a replica of Mortensen and Wright (2002), but with private information. A simple necessary and sufficient condition on the parameters of the model for existence of equilibrium with entry is obtained. As...

Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.

We study a mechanism designer’s trade-off between the complexity level and optimality level of a mechanism. While our techniques apply to a much larger class of mechanism design problems, we focus on the quality differentiation model of Mussa and Rosen (1978), restricting the monopolist to...

We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. A friction parameter is [tau], the length of the time period until the next meeting. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the...

Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.

We study equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game (DMBG) with two-sided private information bilateral bargaining. The model is a private information replica of Mortensen and Wright (2002). There are two kinds of frictions: time discounting and explicit search costs. A simple...

We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.