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Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment

Triossi, Matteo - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2006

A common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commitment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We drop such assumption and we show that costless electoral campaign can be an effective way of transmitting information to voters. The result is robust to relevant equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405552

Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Wahltermine

Mechtel, Mario; Potrafke, Niklas - In: Ifo Schnelldienst 65 (2012) 16, pp. 35-37

Zahlreiche Studien haben gezeigt, dass Wähler ihre Zustimmung oder Ablehnung zur amtierenden Regierung entscheidend davon abhängig machen, wie sie deren Leistung in Bezug auf die Arbeitsmarktsituation einschätzen. Regierungen haben aus diesem Grund einen Anreiz, Arbeitslosigkeit insbesondere...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877426

Wirtschaftslage und Regierungsideologie in Europa

Potrafke, Niklas; Reischmann, Markus; Riem, Marina; … - In: Ifo Schnelldienst 67 (2014) 09, pp. 18-25

Im gegenwärtigen Europawahlkampf vertritt Jean-Claude Juncker die Ansicht, dass europäische Staaten mit konservativen Regierungen bessere wirtschaftliche Daten vorweisen können als Staaten mit sozialistischen Regierungen. Ob Regierungen unterschiedlicher parteipolitischer Zusammensetzung auch...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877492

Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure

Dahm, Matthias; Porteiro, Nicolas - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2005

We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide verifiable policy-relevant information to a political decision-maker and to exert political pressure on her. We show that both lobbying instruments are interdependent. In our view information provision is a risky attempt to affect the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824648

Influential Opinion Leaders

Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2010

We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse candidates and endorsements are … observed by the voters. We show that the equilibrium election outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though … decentralized in the sense that individual experts have no incentive to exert influence. The effect arises when some agents prefer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008470413

The Political Economy of Interest Groups: Pressure and Information

Porteiro, Nicolas; Dahm, Matthias - Econometric Society - 2004

We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342190

Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts

Battaglini, Marco - In: Advances in Theoretical Economics 4 (2004) 1, pp. 1100-1100

We study policy advice by several experts with noisy private information and biased preferences. We highlight a trade …-off between the truthfulness of the information revealed by each expert and the number of signals from different experts that can … be aggregated to reduce noise. Contrary to models with perfectly informed experts, because of this trade-off, full …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005458885

Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform

Dahm, Matthias; Porteiro, Nicolas - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2005

Since campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to ‘buy favors’, this paper assumes that contributions influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252342

How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment

Fatás, Enrique; Neugebauer, Tibor; Tamborero, Pilar - Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Government of Andalusia - 2004

We report on an experimental study with real-world politicians. These political experts face political choice problems … effect, loss aversion, framing effects, and the common ratio effect- with experts from the field. Their choices violate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063155

The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information

DAHM, Matthias; PORTEIRO, Nicolas - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043115