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Mitigating non-contractable actions by randomness

Strausz, Roland - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000683419

Delegation of monitoring in a principal-agent relationship

Strausz, Roland - In: The review of economic studies 64 (1997) 3, pp. 337-357

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001239943

On incentives and asymmetric information in organizations

Strausz, Roland - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000980908

Collusion and renegotiation in a principal-supervisor-agent relationship

Strausz, Roland - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 99 (1997) 4, pp. 497-518

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001230939

Timing of verification procedures : monitoring versus auditing

Strausz, Roland - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001675010

Deterministic mechanisms are optimal in standard principal-agent models

Strausz, Roland - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001939859

Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models

Strausz, Roland - In: Journal of economic theory 128 (2006) 1, pp. 306-314

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003335378

Buried in paperwork : excessive reporting in organizations

Strausz, Roland - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 60 (2006) 4, pp. 460-470

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003357772

Timing of vertification procedures: monitoring versus auditing

Strausz, Roland - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 59 (2006) 1, pp. 89-107

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003245898

Interim information in long term contracts

Strausz, Roland - 2005

This paper studies the effectiveness of interim information in reducing inefficiencies in long term relationships. If the interim information is verifiable, it resolves all problems of asymmetric information. Under nonverifiability, the information alleviates the contracting problem only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343964