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In this paper we want to analyze the internal divisional structure within an organi-zation in the framework of incomplete contract theory. We use the framework of Aghionand Tirole (1997) and define the managerial control structure as sequence of search.A key feature of this paper which...
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This paper aims to shed light on the long-standing debate on opportunistic and information perspectives of earnings management from a controlled laboratory experiment. Our results are in favor of the moral hazard explanation over the explanation based on the signaling motive. When we introduce a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834805
We set up a model on the hold-up problem with uncertain bargaining power and find that, when agents are overconfident about their bargaining power ex ante, both of them may endogenously choose incomplete contract over complete contract even when complete contracting is feasible. The intuition...
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