Using a sample of China's listed firms during 2007-2009, we examine the effect of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on collateral requirements of bank loans. We find that governance of foreign shareholders, other large shareholders and the two-tier boards affect collateral...

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow...

This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in...

This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on collateral requirements using the sample of China's listed firms from 2007 to 2009. We find that compared to privately controlled companies, state-controlled companies have lower collateral requirements, and such difference is more...

This paper investigates pay dispersion and its effects on firm performance in China's listed firms. Due to weak investor protection and an inefficient legal system, China is expected to have a lower level of corporate governance. In this weak institutional environment, we argue that awarding...