We consider an economy where production may use labor of two different skill levels. Workers are heterogeneous and, by investing in education, self-select into one of the two skills. Ex-ante, when firms choose their investments in physical capital, they do not know the level of human capital...

The objective of this paper is to model explicitly the possibility to form temporary matching in a model of two-sided search. The agents (workers and employers) differ in their human quality endowment. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents within their...

Wir untersuchen den theoretischen Fall einer Ökonomie in der zwei verschiedene Ausbildungstypen in der Produktion verwendet werden. Die Arbeitskräfte sind heterogen in Hinblick auf ihre Fähigkeiten und selektieren sich durch unterschiedlich hohe Investitionen in Humankapital in einen der...