A partially informed expert, A, strategically transmits information to a principal, P. The residual uncertainty faced by the expert effectively causes the bias between P and A to be random, with two consequences. First, by misreporting A is likely to induce a decision choice by P, after the...

Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is...

Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is...

Peer activities influence incentives in teams involving incomplete information through the information they transmit. One channel of information transmission is through costless signaling - team bonding, motivational sessions etc. - which in the language of game theory is cheap talk. Another is...

Rarely, if ever, do parties contemplating a joint project commit resources without engaging in non-binding discussions on who does what. Here we argue that such noncommittal discussions may be essential to complete a joint project. We make this point by identifying an interesting class of...