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Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? : an experimental test of adverse syelection theory

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.; Stahl, Konrad - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009767292

Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences : an experimental study

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: The review of economic studies 80 (2013) 4, pp. 1516-1544

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010202076

Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? : an experimental test of adverse selection theory

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Games and economic behavior 89 (2015), pp. 17-33

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383729

Observability of information acquisition in agency models

Hoppe, Eva I. - In: Economics letters 119 (2013) 1, pp. 104-107

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009727018

Observability of Information Acquisition in Agency Models

Hoppe, Eva I. - 2013

We consider an adverse selection model in which the agent can gather private information before the principal offers the contract. There are two scenarios. In scenario I, information gathering is a hidden action, while in scenario II, the principal observes the agent's information gathering...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013088898