Several indivisible goods are to be divided among two or more players, whose bids for the goods determine their prices. An equitable assignment of the goods at competitive prices is given by a fair-division procedure, called the Gap Procedure, that ensures (1) nonnegative prices that never...

We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism whereby for two bargainers, a Buyer and a Seller, it is a weakly dominant strategy to report their reservation prices in the 1st stage. If the Buyer reports a higher price than the Seller, then the referee announces that there is the possibility for trade,...

A classic challenge in contract and property law is unstructured negotiation between two parties with asymmetric information (i.e., each party has different private information) under bilateral monopoly (each party must negotiate with the other to try to reach an agreement), which often leads to...

The recent controversy over "Don't Ask, Don't Waive" standstills in M&A practice highlights the need to apply mechanism design to change-of-control transactions. In this Article, we propose a novel two-stage auction procedure that induces honest bidding among participants while potentially...