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Dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions

Lerner, Anat; Gonen, Rica - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 13 (2013) 1, pp. 363-380

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009788886

Autocratic mechanisms : a form of dictatorship in constrained combinatorial auctions

Lerner, Anat; Gonen, Rica - In: International game theory review 17 (2015) 4, pp. 1-25

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392109

Efficient constrained combinatorial auctions

Lerner, Anat; Gonen, Rica - In: International game theory review 18 (2016) 3, pp. 1-10

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011571602

Sponsored search auctions with reserve prices : going beyond separability

Gonen, Rica; Vassilvitskii, Sergei - In: Internet and network economics : 4th international …, (pp. 597-608). 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003792899

An adaptive sponsored search mechanism ð-gain Truthful in valuation, time, and budget

Gonen, Rica; Pavlov, Elan - In: Internet and network economics : third international …, (pp. 341-346). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003648915

Characterizing truthful market design

Gonen, Mira; Gonen, Rica; Pavlov, Elan - In: Internet and network economics : third international …, (pp. 590-595). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003649797

Auctioning public goods to groups of agents

Alboth, Dirk - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000976281

Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods

Alboth, Dirk - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000981725

Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods

Alboth, Dirk; Lerner, Anat; Shalev, Jonathan - In: Journal of public economic theory 3 (2001) 4, pp. 501-525

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001615916

Auctioning Public Goods to Groups of Agents

Alboth, Dirk; Lerner, Anat; Shalev, Jonathan - 1998

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to each group, which is not commonly known. We investigate an auction mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065955