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A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design

Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive … matter what occurs at non-simple histories. We use our gradated approach to simplicity to provide characterizations of simple … mechanisms. While more demanding simplicity standards may reduce the flexibility of the designer in some cases, this is not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220157

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin - 2013

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087203

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087422

A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation‐based tâtonnement

Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 943-978

The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit‐free, ex post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806306

Informational hold up and intermediaries

Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049

Implementation with interdependent valuations

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132

A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design

Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 91 (2023) 4, pp. 1495-1526

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014365474

Performance‐maximizing large contests

Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 57-88

Many sales, sports, and research contests are put in place to maximize contestants’ performance. We investigate and provide a complete characterization of the prize structures that achieve this objective in settings with many contestants. The contestants may be ex-ante asymmetric in their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159024

Procurement mechanisms for assortments of differentiated products

Saban, Daniela; Weintraub, Gabriel - 2020

We consider the problem faced by a procurement agency that runs a mechanism for constructing an assortment of differentiated products with posted prices, from which heterogeneous consumers buy their most preferred alternative. Procurement mechanisms used by large organizations, including...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012244488

A quantitative version of Myerson regularity

Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2015

In auction and mechanism design, Myerson's classical regularity condition is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper introduces L-regularity as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402720