The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental … preventive wars when the power shift is smaller and when the rising state has the commitment power. Communication and repeated …

war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the … only cause of war under commitment problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if …

war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the … only cause of war under commitment problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if … muss, in zukünftigen Verhandlungen mit einem militärisch stärker werdenden Staat, ein schlechteres Verhandlungsergebnis zu …

their communication links with upfront transfers. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for …

shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, the rejected offer determines how conflict is played if negotiations fail. In turn …, how players are expected to play during conflict determines their negotiating positions. In equilibrium, negotiations … brinkmanship—the only acceptable offer is the one made when conflict is imminent. If negotiations fail, conflict is prolonged and …

the two contrasting forms of communication, we find that the average agreed prices of the two treatments are identical …. But when subjects can talk, fewer offers are exchanged, negotiations finish faster, the likelihood of reaching agreement …

We examine settings - such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war - in which players first make non …-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is … efficient ex post, but we show that a player may prefer Conflict ex ante if there are sufficient asymmetries in strength. There …