Contents: Part I -- Introduction -- 1. Behavioral industrial organization: a synthesis of behavioral economics and industrial organization / Elizabeth Schroeder, Carol Horton Tremblay, and Victor J. Tremblay -- Part II -- Behavioral issues and industrial organization -- 2. Relative thinking and...

We investigate why a firm might purposefully hire a chief executive officer (CEO) who under- or over-estimates the degree of substitutability between competing products. This counterintuitive result arises in imperfect competition because CEO bias can affect rival behavior and the intensity of...

An owner of a firm may choose to hire an unbiased CEO or one with confidence bias. We develop a model that demonstrates that the owner's optimal choice depends on whether the firm and rival choice variables are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. When choice variables are strategic...

Chapter 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2 Demand, Technology, and the Theory of the Firm -- Chapter 3 Introductory Game Theory and Economic Information -- Chapter 4 Behavioral Economics -- Chapter 5 Perfect Competition and Market Imperfections -- Chapter 6 Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition --...