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Procurement with unforeseen contingencies
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017 - This version: October 15, 2017
mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost to the buyer. The direct mechanism, however … propose an indirect mechanism that implements the same allocation but does not require any such prior knowledge. The optimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762526
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Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes
De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2014
We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k ) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721
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Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes
De Clippel, Geoffroy - 2014
We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051820
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Optimal and Fair Prizing in Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments : Experimental Evidence
Lauber, Arne; March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco - 2022
We report results from the first experimental study of round-robin tournaments. In our experiment, we investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fair-ness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293842
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Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences
Mora, Ernesto Rivera - In: Journal of economic theory : JET 216 (2024), pp. 1-36
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015067076
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Auctions and Leaks : A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation
Fischer, Sven - 2017
In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers … eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947421
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Spite and reciprocity in auctions
Nishimura, Naoko; Cason, Timothy N.; Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; … - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 365-411
) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a …. The model also predicts different bidding behavior in second price as compared to ascending-bid auctions. The paper also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752417
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Rationalizing (Non-)Equilibrium Bidding in Maximum-Value Auctions Without Beliefs About Others’ Behavior
Pezanis-Christou, Paul - 2019
We propose a novel approach to the modelling of second-price Maximum-Value auctions that assumes no belief about others …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896753
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Screening Inattentive Buyers
Mensch, Jeffrey - 2022
loss of generality to consider contour mechanisms, which comprise triplets of allocation probabilities, prices, and beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013306514
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Effects of experience, choice architecture, and cognitive reflection in strategyproof mechanisms
Schneider, Mark; Porter, David P. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 171 (2020), pp. 361-377
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012288042