This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the classical Condorcet jury model by introducing a new informational structure that captures consistency of information. In contrast to the impossibility result shown by Coughlan...

We study cheap talk communication in a simple two actions-two states model featuring ambiguous priors. First, we find that in equilibrium, S typically mixes between messages triggering different behavior by R while R himself mixes after some message. Technically, the mixing performed by S is...

We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous biases. We test models assuming respectively self-interested and strategic-, joint payoff-maximizing- and cognitively heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees...

Ambiguous language is ubiquitous and often deliberate. Recent theoretical work (Beauchêne et al., 2019; Bose and Renou, 2014; Kellner and Le Quement, 2018) has shown how language ambiguation can improve outcomes by mitigating conflict of interest. Our experiment finds a significant effect of language...