Meier [Games Econ. Behav. 62, 53–66] shows that the universal knowledge–belief space exists. However, besides the universality there is an other important property might be imposed on knowledge–belief spaces, inherited also from type spaces, the completeness. In this paper, we introduce...

Im folgenden Beitrag wird die Dynamik von Marktprozessen in der deutschen Automobilindustrie mit Hilfe von Regelkreismodellen und Zeitreihenanalysen sichtbar gemacht und quantifiziert. Dargestellt werden der Markträumungs-, der Renditenormalisierungs-, der Übermachterosions-, der...

Perfectly competitive economies are economic models with many agents, each of whom is relatively insignificant. This chapter studies the relations between the basic economic concept of competitive (or Walrasian ) equilibrium , and the game-theoretic solution concept of value . It includes the...

Two well-known mechanisms for enhancing managers' accountability are yardstick competition and internal monitoring. Yardstick competition puts managers in direct competition when firms make decisions for re-appointment (Tirole, 2006). Monitoring is used by firms to detect managers' rent-seeking...

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rankorder tournaments. This survey...

This paper studies a class of games, quot;All-Pay Contestsquot;, which captures general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying, competition for market power, labor-market tournaments, and Ramp;D races. Players compete for one of several identical prizes by...

We analyse incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is some noisy ranking of the partners' efforts. This enables us to ensure both first best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output...

We report an experimental test of alternative rules in innovation contests when success may not be feasible and contestants may learn from each other. Following Halac et al. (forthcoming), the contest designer can vary the prize allocation rule from Winner-Take-All in which the first successful...

Tournaments consisting of iterative matches are a common mechanism for determining how to allocate a prize. For this reason it is important to understand the behavioral as well as the theoretical properties of different tournament structures. Given that laboratory experiments have consistently...