The original motivations of antitrust suggest an alternative remedy for market power: changes to corporate governance to include stakeholders who are subject to this power. In contrast to structural and behavioral remedies, “stakeholder remedies,” as we call them, have several desirable...

Democratic institutions aggregate preferences poorly. The norm of one-person-one-vote with majority rule treats people fairly by giving everyone an equal chance to influence outcomes, but fails to give proportional weight to people whose interests in a social outcome are stronger than those of...

"Many blame today's economic inequality, stagnation, and political instability on the free market. The solution is to rein in the market, right? [This book] turns this thinking--and pretty much all conventional thinking about markets, both for and against--on its head. The book reveals...new...

Can mechanism design save democracy? We propose a simple design that offers a chance: individuals pay for as many votes as they wish using a number of "voice credits" quadratic in the votes they buy. Only quadratic cost induces marginal costs linear in votes purchased and thus welfare optimality...

Soziale Ungleichheit und ökonomische Stagnation auf den freien Märkten sind die zentralen Probleme unserer Zeit. Die Lösung: den Markt endlich zügeln, oder? Die Querdenker Posner und Weyl stellen dieses Denken - und so ziemlich alles konventionelle Denken über Wirtschaft - buchstäblich auf...

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- PREFACE. The Auction Will Set You Free -- FOREWORD -- Introduction. THE CRISIS OF THE LIBERAL ORDER -- 1. Property Is Monopoly -- 2. Radical Democracy -- 3. Uniting the World’s Workers -- 4. Dismembering the Octopus -- 5. Data as Labor --...

This online appendix proves the central result in Lalley and Weyl (Forthcoming). The full text PDF for "Qaudratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy" may be found here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531