We analyze oligopolistic exhaustible-resource depletion when firms can trade forward contracts on deliveries – a market structure relevant for some resource markets (e.g., storable pollution permits, hydro-based power pools) – and find that trading forwards can have substantial implications...

Motivated by the structure of existing pollution permit markets, we study the equilibrium path that results from allocating an initial stock of storable permits to a large polluting agent and a competitive fringe. A large agent selling permits in the market exercises market power no differently...

We consider a situation where an exhaustible-resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a perfect substitute but there is a time-to-build delay for the substitute. We that find in this simple framework the basic implications of the Hotelling model (1931) are reversed: over time the stock...

We consider a model of cake-eating with private information. The model captures phenomena such as trust and "security of supply" in resource-use relationships. It also predicts supply shocks as an equilibrium phenomenon: privately informed sellers have incentives to reveal resource scarcity too...

We consider a situation where an exhaustible-resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a perfect substitute but there is a time-to-build delay for the substitute. We that find in this simple framework the basic implications of the Hotelling model (1931) are reversed: over time the stock...