In many scenarios such as banking and liquidity crises, inefficiencies often arise because investors face uncertainties about economic fundamentals and the strategies of other investors. How information affects fundamental uncertainty is well studied, but how information affects strategic...

We study agents' information acquisition decisions in a beauty contest game when they can access multiple information sources with different content and clarity. Each information source sends a signal with a common noise, and each agent observes this signal with an additional idiosyncratic...

This paper examines the ex ante effects of public information quality on market prices and how such effects vary with information asymmetry among traders in a two-period experimental market. We vary public information quality by changing its precision and information asymmetry among traders by...

We provide experimental evidence that under strong beauty contest incentives, players ignore signals from an information source with high content if the source has low clarity. Instead, they acquire equally costly signals from a source with higher clarity despite its lower content. Content...

We study how uniformed traders (defined as strategic traders not endowed with private information) use public disclosure and prices to form beliefs and trade. We manipulate the availability of public forecasts (e.g. earnings forecasts) of forthcoming public signals (e.g., earnings...