We consider an economy in which competitive firms use three technologies for electricity production: pollutive fossils, intermittent renewables like wind or solar, and storage. We determine optimal subsidies for renewables and storage capacities when carbon pricing is imperfect. This policy is...

We consider an economy in which competitive firms use three technologies for electricity production: pollutive fossils, intermittent renewables like wind or solar, and storage. We determine optimal subsidies for renewables and storage capacities when carbon pricing is imperfect. This policy is...

Energy system and power market models refrain from distinguishing between private and social discount rates. We devise a strategy to account for diverging private and social discount rates in intertemporal optimization frameworks, resulting in an optimal carbon tax above the marginal damage when...

Current decarbonization policies neglect damages from local air pollutants. We analyze the trade-off between complementary taxation of carbon emissions and local air pollution. We quantify results for the European power market until 2050. Taxing only air pollution results in social cost of 5,890...

We apply Open Street Map to identify available placement cells and Global Wind Atlas to determine average wind speeds on a 500 x 500m grid in Germany (1.3 million cells). Minimum distances to obstacles such a roads and buildings leave 535,000 potential placement cells. We calculate...

We consider how one party can induce another party to join an international emission compact given private information. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent. This leads to a number of non-standard features: Optimal...

Countries often have private information about their willingness to pay for protecting the climate system and their cost of emission reductions. We use a principal-agent model to re-examine the economic case for unilateral action by individual countries, in our case of the principal. We find...