We analyze a simple model of board voting and find that in comparison to boards with an even number of directors (even boards), those with an odd number of directors (odd boards) improve voting efficiency by better aggregating directors' information. Consistent with the model's implications, our...

In this paper we study CEO contract design employing a unique dataset on privately-held and public firm CEO annual compensation over the period 1999-2011. We first show that CEOs in public firms are paid 30% more than CEOs in comparable privately-held firms. We further show that both private and...

We compare CEO turnover in public and large private firms. Public firms have higher turnover rates and exhibit greater turnover-performance sensitivities than private firms. Controlling for pre-turnover performance, performance improvements are greater for private firms than for public firms. We...

We provide new evidence on the debate whether CEOs in public U.S. firms are significantly overpaid using their counterparts in private U.S. firms over the period 1999 to 2008. Using public and private firm CEO pay data made available through mandated SEC disclosures, we first show that after...

We examine the board composition and the role of outside directors in U.S. private firms. We find that compared with public firms, private firms have a higher proportion of outside directors on the boards and select their outside directors in a more responsive way to their advisory and...