We show that a strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.

A strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quas-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequency of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.

In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to perfectly coordinate their behavior. Our study of repeated games with imperfect private monitoring focusses on the coordination problem that arises without public signals.

The theory of repeated games occupies a central place in noncooperative game theory as it forms a relatively simple platform from which to study dynamic aspects of strategic interaction. In this paper we attempt a synthesis of the various folk theorems by adpting a point of view which...

In this paper, the authors use a model of tax competition to study the role of information sharing in common agency problems.

We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the N-person unaimity bargaining game.

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.