How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?

We show that a strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Mailath, G.J. ; Samuelson, L.
Institutions:	Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
Subject:	GAMES \| GAME THEORY

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Series:	Working papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443499