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Labour Disputes and the Game of Legal Representation

Fraisse, Henri - 2021

This paper explores the prisoner’s dilemma that may result when workers and firms are involved in labour disputes and must decide whether to hire a lawyer to be represented at trial. Using a representative data set of labour disputes in the UK and a large population of French unfair dismissal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316203

How asymmetrically increasing joint strike costs need not lead to fewer strikes

Pantsios, Archontis L.; Polachek, Solomon W. - 2017

The "joint costs" model states that the incentive to strike is inversely related to the total costs associated with … workers' and firms' strike activities. Not only has this model been tested with mixed results, but also the joint costs model … is problematic in explaining several stylized facts in the strike literature because higher strike costs do not always …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011641774

Streiks und private Informationen

Goerke, Laszlo - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011876424

Effective labor relations laws and social welfare

Landeo, Claudia; Niktin, Maxim - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376699

Dynamic contractual enforcement : a model of strikes

Robinson, James Alan - In: International economic review 40 (1999) 1, pp. 209-229

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001353466

Immediate settlement or enduring a strike : the choice of signals

Yao, Zhiyong - In: Bulletin of economic research 67 (2015) 4, pp. 324-335

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011396481

The Five-Tool Mediator : Game Theory, Baseball Practices and Southpaw Scouting

Widener, Michael N. - 2017

This essay borrows heavily from the fields of game theory, baseball business strategy and neuropsychology. Knitting these together, the author advocates that mediators become inciters and advocates for an outcome that solves problems, irrespective of the amount in controversy and the initial gap...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014182916

A Game Theoretic Model for Determining When Baseball Arbitration Creates the Proper Incentives for Litigants

Habbu, Aditya (Adi); Buonaguro, Paul V. - 2011

This paper creates a game theoretic model to determine how pendulum arbitration or baseball arbitration impacts the incentives of litigants. Pendulum arbitration is when both parties submit competing proposals and the arbitrator chooses only one of the bids, in its entirety, to be binding on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043074

Commitment Problems and War in International Bargaining

Amann, Erwin; Leonhardt, Nadine - 2013

In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160801

Do Workers Negotiate Collectively or Separately? An Application of a Coalitional Bargaining Game with Externalities

Kiyotaki, Fumi - 2016

This study proposes a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game model to analyse wage negotiations between one employer and two workers. Here, randomly selected workers choose whether to negotiate their wage contracts together or separately, considering wage contract externalities. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996131