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Commitments, intentions, truth and Nash equilibria

Schlag, Karl H.; Vida, Péter - 2013

Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432

Believing when credible : talking about future plans and past actions

Vida, Péter - 2015

We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345781

Whom are you talking with? : an experiment on credibility and communication structure

Grandjean, Gilles; Mantovani, Marco; Mauleon, Ana; … - 2014

messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867

Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk : the two-player case

Vida, Péter; Forges, Françoise - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 1, pp. 95-123

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687076

Teams versus individuals in pre-play cheap talk communication

Yang, Huanxing; Ye, Zexin; Zhang, Lan - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 114 (2025), pp. 1-17

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015190643

Vertical undbundling, the coordination of investment, and network pricing

Brunekreeft, Gert; Friedrichsen, Nele - 2010

This paper provides a formal analysis on the investment coordination problem in a vertically separated electricity … decisions of network and power plants need to be coordinated. In unbundled markets, firm-internal coordination no longer applies …. We develop a formal approach to examine whether sim- ple information exchange ("cheap talk") could restore coordination …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010421957

Information-revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information

Ganguly, Chirantan; Ray, Indrajit - 2015

type-coordination property: it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium when the players' types are … different. Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the High-type is not truthful …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317848

Strategic communication : an experimental investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014

In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085

Communication in cournot oligopoly

Goltsman, Maria; Pavlov, Gregory - 2012

We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We show that cheap talk between the firms cannot transmit any information. However, if the firms can communicate through a third party,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009633349

Cheap talk with correlated signals

Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2013

We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326