Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk : the two-player case

Péter Vida and Françoise Forges

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.

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Year of publication:	January 2013
Authors:	Vida, Péter ; Forges, Françoise
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 8.2013, 1, p. 95-123
Subject:	Bayesian game \| cheap talk \| communication equilibrium \| correlated equilibrium \| pre-play communication \| Kommunikation \| Communication \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE944 [DOI] hdl:10419/150186 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687076