Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Vida, Péter ; Forges, Francoise
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Kommunikation \| Gleichgewicht \| Theorie \| Bayesian game \| cheap talk \| communication equilibrium \| correlated equilibrium \| pre-play communication

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 3360
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	659466902 [GVK] hdl:10419/46455 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274917