In a series of one-shot linear public goods game, we ask subjects to report their contributions, their contribution plans for the next period, and their first-order beliefs about their present and future partner. We estimate subjects' preferences from plans data by a infinite mixture approach...

In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responderś conflict payoff. Neither variation affects...

In the context of an allocation game, this paper analyses the proposerś reported beliefs about the responderś willingness to accept (or reject) the proposed split of the pie. The proposerś beliefs are elicited via a quadratic scoring rule. An econometric model of the proposerś beliefs is...

In Experimental Economics, coordination games are used to elicit social norms as incentivized beliefs about others' beliefs. Conversely, representative surveys like the World Values Survey elicit social norms as personal attitudes and values that are independent of others' beliefs. Using a...