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Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415641
In many situations, agents are involved in an allocation problem that is followed by another allocation problem whose optimal solution depends on how the former problem has been solved. In this paper, we take this dynamic structure of allocation problems as an institutional constraint. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034984
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689095
and Sonnenschein (1975) that also generalizes the dcmechanism of Koray and Yildiz (2018) which relates implementation via … mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate … provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash's demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499554
Ostracism is practiced by virtually all societies around the world as a means of enforcing cooperation and excluding members who show anti-social behaviors or attitudes. In this paper, we use a public goods experiment to study whether groups choose to implement an institution that allows for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011992304
We perform a laboratory test of Pledge-and-Review bargaining, implementing a simplified version of the model analysed in Harstad (2019). In theory, this institution should increase contributions to a public good only if there is uncertainty over the value of possible future payoffs. In contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013237684
We develop a dynamic model in which a group collectively bargains with an external party. At each date the group makes an offer to the external party (the 'agent') in exchange for a concession. Group members hold heterogeneous preferences over agreements and are uncertain about the agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014444047
distribution in a society. Following Harsanyi’critique (Harsanyi, 1974), we also study implementation problems in vNM stable set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014244124
rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011483605
We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220157