In this paper, we take a first step toward exploring empirically the product assortment strategies of oligopolistic firms. Our starting point is a discrete-choice demand model for differentiated products. We incorporate the demand model into an equilibrium supply model, in which firms compete by...

This paper proposes a strategic model of entry that allows for positive and negative spillovers among firms. The model is applied to a novel dataset containing information about the store configurations of all US regional shopping centers and is used to quantify the magnitude of inter-store...

We develop a method to estimate a game’s primitives in complex dynamic environments. Because of the environment’s complexity, agents may not know or understand some key features of their interaction. Instead of equilibrium assumptions, we impose an asymptotic ε-regret (ε-AR) condition on...

There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for...

In this paper, I identify and examine a class of normative theories that may cause rational managers to inadvertently destroy firm value in equilibrium. The problem occurs when firms take prescribed actions that result in the outcomes predicted by the theory, even though the theory rests upon...

This survey presents in a historical way the main contributions to the hardcore theory of aggregative games and the applications of this model to several fields of economics, other social sciences and engineering

This paper studies how product differentiation affects substitution patterns and firms' markups in oligopolistic markets where products are differentiated over multiple attributes and consumers have linear-quadratic preferences. Under these assumptions, the cross-price elasticity between any two...

We provide a model of dynamic duopoly in which firms face financial constraints and disappear when they are unable to fulfill them. We show that, in some cases, Cournot outputs are no longer supported in equilibrium, because if these outputs were set, a firm may have incentives to ruin the...

In this paper we study the nature of incentive contracts and organizational modes in a game where the firms' owners endogenously determine the order of moves at the quantity-setting stage, can choose to delegate the production decision to a manager and write appropriate incentive contracts. It...