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Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bargaining Solutions

Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma - 2020

We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041039

Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

Takamiya, Koji (contributor) - 2006

solution is a strong core selection. Given this fact, this paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation … equilibrium outcomes coincides with the strong core. This generalizes one of the results by Shin and Suh (1996) obtained in the …. -- generalized indivisible good allocation problem ; preference revelation game ; strict strong Nash equilibrium ; strong core …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321321

Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities

Takamiya, Koji - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733933

Characterization of the Weak Core of Simple Games with Infinitely Many Alternatives

Yu, Chaowen - 2018

We show that the characterization result of the weak core correspondence in simple games in Takamiya et al. (2018) still holds true even when the set of alternatives contains uncountably infinite elements

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913496

Strategy Proofness and Coalitional Stability in Assignment Problems with Externalities

Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée; Triossi, Matteo - 2023

We study assignment problems with externalities where agents have expectations about the reactions of other agents to group deviations. We present notions of core consistent with such expectations and identify the largest and smallest cores. We restrict the domain of preferences to study the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014358116

Job Rotation : Core and Mechanism

Zhang, Jun - 2020

Yu and Zhang (2020) propose a job rotation model to study rotation schemes thatwidely exist in real life. In the model agents' rights to consume own endowmentsare restricted, but their rights to trade endowments are unrestricted. This poses aninteresting contrast with the housing market model of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012836823

Coalition Formation Problems With Externalities

Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée; Triossi, Matteo - 2022

stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014256282

Games with Capacity Manipulation : Incentives and Nash Equilibria

Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - 2018

a necessary and sufﬁcient condition that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014225211

Efficient Coalitional Bargaining with Noncontingent Offers II : Sequential Proposer Protocol

Chaturvedi, Rakesh - 2017

equilibrium in pure stationary strategies whose limiting outcome as players get more patient is the core-constrained Nash …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352

On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2014

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472889