The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental … preventive wars when the power shift is smaller and when the rising state has the commitment power. Communication and repeated …

war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the … only cause of war under commitment problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if …

war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the … only cause of war under commitment problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if … muss, in zukünftigen Verhandlungen mit einem militärisch stärker werdenden Staat, ein schlechteres Verhandlungsergebnis zu …

their communication links with upfront transfers. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for …

We examine settings - such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war - in which players first make non …-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is … efficient ex post, but we show that a player may prefer Conflict ex ante if there are sufficient asymmetries in strength. There …