Traditionally, researchers have had difficulty testing the relationship between the degree of risk or uncertainty in workers' environments and incentive pay. The authors employ Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to...

Using data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) employer survey, we document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. Among other results, we also show that: wage increases associated with...

This paper empirically studies the extent to which career concerns as part of a typical contract offer influence employees’ work performance in a Japanese auto dealership firm. Since career movements and base wage adjustments rely on performance evaluation over time, we develop a dynamic...

The authors empirically test Prendergast’s (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives. Using data from the 1998 British WERS, the authors...

Using a novel panel dataset of corporate inventors matched with their employers in Japan, we examine the effects of output-based financial incentives on corporate inventor's performance. We exploit the 2001 court decision that discontinuously forced many firms to adopt or strengthen the...