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Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003023978

Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties : punishment or rent extraction?

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013532091

Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: European economic review : EER 57 (2013) 1, pp. 108-117

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009706219

The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 117 (2012) 3, pp. 841-843

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009682589

Public procurement in times of crisis : the bundling decision reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 121 (2013) 3, pp. 533-536

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010393032

Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: The Rand journal of economics 36 (2005) 2, pp. 318-336

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003238877

The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581839

Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 183 (2019), pp. 1-4

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012122546

Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties : punishment or rent extraction?

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 224 (2023), pp. 1-4

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014307606

Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted

Müller, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics Letters 129 (2015) C, pp. 116-120

When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263395