​We show that firms led by politically partisan CEOs are associated with a higher level of corporate tax sheltering than firms led by nonpartisan CEOs. Specifically, Republican CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering even when their wealth is not tied with that of shareholders...

This paper studies the effects of CEOs' political preferences on corporate tax avoidance. CEOs' party affiliations are identified by their political donations during election cycles. Using four measures of tax avoidance from the literature (book-to-tax difference, shelter activities, permanent...

This paper investigates the impact of managerial compensation on the likelihood of covenant violations and reports that higher CEO risk-shifting incentives significantly increase the likelihood of covenant violations. Evidence suggests that CEOs with creditor unfriendly compensation in leveraged...

We find a negative relationship between managerial ability and tax aggressiveness. The result is robust to a wide range of measures of tax aggressiveness, inclusion of firm fixed effects, and the use of a difference-in-differences approach using information regarding CEO turnover to control for...

We examine the effect of top leader teams’ (TLT) traits on productivity using provincial level data in China over the period 1995-2015. Applying a difference-in-difference approach, we find significant causative leadership effects on productivity. In particular, TLTs’ education level and...

This study investigates whether CEO perquisite of borrowing firms plays any significant role, both in terms of price and non-price settings, in financial contracts and reveals that lending banks demand significantly higher return (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with...