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Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders

Dobzinski, Shahar; Fu, Hu; Kleinberg, Robert - In: Games and economic behavior 92 (2015), pp. 349-369

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011387513

Introduction to computer science and economic theory

Blume, Lawrence E.; Easley, David; Kleinberg, Jon; … - In: Journal of economic theory 156 (2015), pp. 1-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011527580

Truthful germs are contagious : a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness

Archer, Aaron; Kleinberg, Robert - In: Games and economic behavior 86 (2014), pp. 340-366

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304974

Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings

Hartline, Jason D.; Kleinberg, Robert; Malekian, Azarakhsh - In: Games and economic behavior 92 (2015), pp. 401-429

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011387515

Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design

Kleinberg, Robert; Weinberg, S. Matthew - In: Games and economic behavior 113 (2019), pp. 97-115

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012174468

Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient

Feldman, Michal; Fu, Hu; Gravin, Nikolai; Lucier, Brendan - In: Games and economic behavior 123 (2020), pp. 327-341

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430766

Introduction to computer science and economic theory

Blume, Lawrence; Easley, David; Kleinberg, Jon; … - In: Journal of Economic Theory 156 (2015) C, pp. 1-13

This essay introduces the symposium on computer science and economic theory.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189760

Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity

Lavi, Ron; Swamy, Chaitanya - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 1, pp. 99-124

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897158

Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items

Lavi, Ron; Nisan, Noam - In: Journal of economic theory 156 (2015), pp. 45-76

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011527593

Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms

Aricha, Inbar; Smorodinsky, Rann - In: International Journal of Game Theory 42 (2013) 4, pp. 931-946

We study an incomplete information mechanism design problem with three peculiarities. First, access to agents’ private information is costly and unobservable. Second, the mechanism may communicate sequentially with the agents. Third, the mechanism designer and all the agents share a common...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993362