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The war of attrition with noisy players

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Minimum-effort coordination games : stochastic potential and logit equilibrium

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Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games

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Ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions

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The logit equilibrium : a perspective on intuitive behavioral anomalies

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A model of noisy introspection

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Noisy directional learning and the logit equilibrium

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An experimental analysis of asymmetric power in conflict bargaining

Sieber, Katri; Clark, David; Holt, Charles A.; … - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 375-397

Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785364