A minimal diversity game is an n player strategic form game in which each player has m pure strategies at his disposal. The payoff to each player is always 1, unless all players select the same pure strategy, in which case all players receive zero payoff. Such a game has a unique isolated...

In games with continuum strategy sets, we model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy, as an atomless probability distribution over the other player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile (strictly) robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes,...

Sets closed under rational behavior were introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991) as subsets of the strategy space that contain all best replies to all strategy profiles in the set. We here consider a more restrictive notion of closure under rational behavior: a subset of the strategy space is...

This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.

We model a player's uncertainty about other player's strategy choices as probability distributions over their strategy sets. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in each of which every...

This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.