Showing 1 - 10 of 11
We study a partnership that anticipates its possible dissolution. In our model, partnerships form in order to take advantage of complementary skills; although new opportunities may arise that make partners ̕skills useless. We characterize the optimal, incentive-compatible partnership contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521452
We study a partnership that anticipates its possible dissolution. In our model, partnerships form in order to take advantage of complementary skills; although new opportunities may arise that make partners' skills useless. We characterize the optimal, incentive-compatible partnership contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002433722
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003993683
We analyze optimal contracts in a hierarchy consisting of a principal, a supervisor and an agent. The supervisor is either neutral or altruistic towards the agent, but his preferences are private information. In a model with two supervisor types, we find that the optimal contract may be very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217083
We consider a situation where an agent's effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent's well being. This is modeled by incorporating the agent's utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first best solution can be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365849
We study theoretically and experimentally the role of fatigue and recovery within a competitive work environment. At work, agents usually make their effort choice in response to competition and monetary incentives. At the same time, they have to take into account fatigue, which accumulates over...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976073
If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895040
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009626479
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011382
If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012931043