We investigate experimentally how the enforcement of negative say on pay (SoP) votes affects a CEO's investment incentives, the level and structure of executive compensation, and firm performance. We operationalize the board's discretion in response to a no-vote via three levels of SoP...

Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs. We provide evidence that these firms routinely disclose information that harms peers’ stock prices. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer-harming disclosures appear to be aimed at the peers whose stock price...

We consider a principal-multi agent model that features a three-tier hierarchy, defined as a setting where the principal contracts with an agent-manager and delegates to the manager some authority to contract with other agents. A key highlight is that incentive compensation, performance...

In the empirical estimation of the relation between CEO pay and both firm and peer performance, researchers typically include conventional accounting-based measures that reflect firm performance net of executive pay expense. We analytically show that when firms evaluate CEO performance relative...

We analyze a two-period agency problem with limited liability and non-verifiable information. The principal commits to a dynamic bonus pool comprising a fixed total payment that may be distributed over time to the agent and a third party. We find that the optimal two-period contract features...